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FRED E. INBAU: "THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING GUILTY"*
YALE KAMISAR**
"The scholar may lose himself in
schools, in words and become a
pedant; but when he comprehends




As fate would have it, Fred Inbau graduated
from law school in 1932, the very year that,
"for practical purposes the modern law of con-
*[Another] general trend has been the Burger
Court's concern with what I call the importance
of being guilty.... From the defense point of
view this means that in the argument of a case
at the appellate level it is extraordinarily impor-
tant today, as it really was not in the 1969's, to
try to establish for the client a tolerable claim of
innocence. Looking at the same litigation from
the State's point of view, the State representative
in appellate litigation today should be clear in
arguing that regardless of what occurred in the
proceedings, the individual defendant before
the court is a guilty individual .... That kind
of argument is likely to be persuasive with the
Burger Court in a way that it clearly would not
have been with the Warren Court.
Whitebread, Trends in Constitutional Law: A Forecast,
in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK 9-1 (National
College of District Attorneys ed. 1977). See also
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 142 (1970).
The argument that "the individual defendant be-
fore the court is a guilty individual" can carry only so
far. That it did not prevail in the recent case of
Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977), hardly
refutes Professor Whitebread's point. If anything,
the fact that "Williams is guilty of the savage murder
of a small child; no member of the Court contends
that he is not," id. at 1248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting),
persuaded, or helped persuade, four Justices to
uphold the admissibility of the confession in the face
of "so clear a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments as here occurred," id. at 1248 (Stewart,
J., majority opinion) tends to support Whitebread's
view.
Inbau, of course, would have no trouble at all
upholding Williams' confession. Indeed, the detec-
tive's "Christian burial speech" ("[Y]ou yourself are
the only person that knows where this little girl's
body is..: I feel [that the parents] should be en-
titled to a Christian burial for [their] little girl [and
that] we should stop and locate it on the way... ")
stitutional criminal procedure [began], with the
decision in the great case of Powell v. Alabama."I
In "the 'stone age' of American criminal proce-
reads like an Inbau hypothetical. The "speech" would
only get results if Williams were guilty; it "did not,
and was not likely to, jeopardize the fairness of
[Williams'] trial or in any way risk the conviction of an
innocent man" 97 S. Ct. at 1259 (White, J., joined by
Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). And In-
bau's "test of confession admissibility" has long been:
"Is what I am about to do or say apt to make an
innocent person confess?"
If the answer to the above question is "No,"
the interrogator should go ahead and do or say
whatever was contemplated ....
In our judgment this is the only understand-
able test of confession admissibility.... More-
over, it is also the only test that is fair both to
the public and to the accused....
F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 157 (Ist ed. 1962). Although this was
the original meaning of the "voluntariness" test, it
cannot be squared, I submit, with what the Court
had been doing in the fifteen years preceding Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), nor even, per-
haps, what it did as early as Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944). See A. BEISEL, CONTROL OVER
ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 70-86 (1955); Allen, Due
Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48
Nw. U.L. REV. 16, 20-25 (1953); Allen, The Supreme
Court, Federalism and State Systems of CriminalJustice, 8
DE PAUL L. REV. 213, 233-40 (1959); Meltzer, Invol-
untary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Be-
tween Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 326-29,
343, 347-49 (1954); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment
and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 417-23
(1954). See generally Kamisar, What Is an Involuntary
Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728
(1963). See also Kamisar, A Confession's Trustworthiness,
It is Argued, Isn't Enough, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1977,
at 19, col. 2.
** Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
I Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The
Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F.
518,521.
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING GUILTY
dure,"2 Inbau began his long fight to shape or
to retain rules that "make sense in the light of
a policeman's task,"3 more aware than most
that so long as the rules do so, "we will be in a
stronger position to insist that [the officer] obey
them."4
Inbau was a pioneer in American constitu-
tional criminal procedure and something of a
prophet. He discerned events in their begin-
nings, he foresaw what was coming and he
forewarned others.
This is evident in his 1942 book, Lie Detection
and Criminal Interrogation,5 where he sought to
classify the kinds of cajolery and deception to
which the police interrogator might and must
not resort- and to explain why- an issue which
at this late date is still "largely unresolved. '"6 It
is evident, too, in Inbau's famous 1948 article,
The Confession Dilemma in the United States Su-
2 Kamisar, Kauper's 'Judicial Examination of the Ac-
cused" Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarka-
ble Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15, 16 (1974).
' Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Sei-
zure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 65, 66 (1957).4Id. But Inbau also told the police, very early in
his career, that they themselves "must share a large
portion of the blame for the unfortunate practical
result of decisions such as those in the McNabb [case].
Known instances of miscarriages of justice resulting
from the use of force and threats in obtaining confes-
sions have rightfully induced the courts to view with
caution all criminal confessions. Better interrogation
practices on the part of the police profession as a
whole would undoubtedly result in sounder and
more practical legal decisions involving criminal
confessions." Inbau, The Courts on Confessions, THE
POLICE DIGEST, Dec. 1943, at 13, 15.
5 F. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTER-
ROGATION 119-33 (1st ed. 1942).
0 H. UVILLER, THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INVESTIGATION 569 (1974). "Oddly," notes Professor
Uviller, "the few [post-Miranda] lower court decisions
addressing deception in interrogation seem reluctant
to forbid all forms of misrepresentation, particularly
[when] neither shocking nor of the sort which creates
the hazard that the innocent suspect might be in-
duced to confess falsely." Id. See Frazier v. Cupp,
394 U.S. 731 (1969) (admitting a confession in a pre-
Miranda case although the police had falsely told the
defendant that another had confessed and had also
"sympathetically" suggested that the victim's homo-
sexual advances may have started the fight). See also
Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) (per
curiam) (holding that Miranda warnings need not
have been given under the circumstances). "What-
ever relevance [the interrogator's false statement to
defendant that his fingerprints had been discovered
at the scene] may have to other issues in the case, it
has nothing to do with whether [defendant] was in
custody for purposes of the Miranda rule." Id. at 714.
preme Court,7 where, drawing upon his rich law
enforcement background, he roundly con-
demned the McNabb decision' on the very
grounds upon which the Mallory case 9 was crit-
icized fourteen years later and for the very
reasons that the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule
was repealed, more or less, some twenty-five
years later.10
Inbau's pioneering spirit was also evident in
his very first classes at the Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law. So one of his most
illustrious students, Frank Allen, himself a
great explorer and early pathfinder in this
field, has often told me. Inbau wrung dry the
relatively few Supreme Court cases then on the
books, perceiving and fretting over all their
"dangerous" implications. Long before there
were any courses or casebooks bearing that
title, Inbau taught criminal procedure and its
constitutional dimensions-all the while he
yearned for, and fought for, the day when
criminal procedure would have no (or at least
very few) constitutional dimensions.
How did his students receive him? How did
the world receive him? Inbau is - well, Inbau.
In the classroom, no less than outside, he was
(depending upon your point of view), amusing
or exasperating, sensible or outrageous, inspir-
ing or infuriating. Whatever the various reac-
tions he engenders, how6ver, I doubt that any
of his students could forget him or his subject
matter or how deeply he cared about it. Many
of his students, hopefully, were less impressed
than he with "the importance of being guilty,"
but (long before this could be said of most law
faculties) all of his students, happily, were
bound to be impressed with the importance of
constitutional criminal procedure.
McNabb (1943) and Ashcraft (1944) greatly
worried Inbau. Although the McNabb-Mallory
rule, which held inadmissible in federal courts
incriminating statements made during unlaw-
ful detentions, was fashioned "quite apart from
the Constitution"1 and in the exercise of the
Court's "supervisory authority over the admin-
istration of [federal] criminal justice," I3 Inbau
feared that some day the Court would find it
7 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948).
8 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
9 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
10 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1970).
11 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).




mandated by the "minimal historical safe-
guards ... summarized as 'due process of
law,'""4 and thus binding on state courts as well
as federal. Ashcraft alarmed him no less than
McNabb. The Ashcraft Court had branded
thirty-six hours of continuous police interroga-
tion "inherently" or "conclusively" coercive,
and Inbau feared that some day the Court
would regard all extended police questioning-
maybe even any police questioning- "inher-
ently coercive." To Inbau, then, McNabb and
Ashcraft were unexploded grenades rolling
around in the interrogation room-and he re-
acted accordingly. Inbau thought, as did I
(arriving on the scene much later), thatMcNabb
would explode first, 5 but we now know that it
only fizzled. The live bomb, and the bigger
one, turned out to be that contained in Ash-
craft. ' 6
The only thing I have ever found surprising
about the Ashcraft case is that three Justices
dissented. 17 1 wish a tape recording of this long
14 "Judicial supervision of the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty
of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence. Such standards are not
satisfied merely by observance of those minimal his-
toric safeguards for securing trial by reason which
are summarized as 'due process of law'. . ." Id. at 340
(Frankfurter, J.). Inbau often referred to the McNabb
case or the McNabb-Mallory rule as the "civilized
standards" rule. See note 48 infra.
" See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949)
(Douglas, J., concurring): "Detention without ar-
raignment is a time-honored method for keeping an
accused under the exclusive control of the police....
We should unequivocally condemn the procedure
and stand ready to outlaw ... any confession ob-
tained during the period of the unlawful detention.
The procedure breeds coerced confessions. It is the
root of the evil."
16 Cf. Brief for the State of Illinois, Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), reprinted in Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 522 (4th ed. 1974):
'To push the right to counsel back to the point
of arrest and to exclude all incriminating state-
ments obtained from an uncounselled defend-
ant anytime thereafter as a product of a four-
teenth amendment violation would be, in effect,
to impose the McNabb-Mallory rule on the states.'
[quoting Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9
(1962).] Indeed, it would be to go beyond the
Mallory rule which forbids the admission in
evidence only of those statements taken during
a period of unlawful detention which may not,
in any given case, begin at the moment of arrest.
17 322 U.S. at 156 (Jackson, J.,joined by Roberts &
Frankfurter, J.J., dissenting).
stretch of questioning had been available and
that the Justices had listened to it, much as
they view "dirty movies" in a screening room
set up for that purpose. Whether or not a
Justice can intelligibly define "coercive ques-
tioning," I think he would "know it" when he
heard it.'
I have often played portions of the tape-
recorded six-hour interrogation in the Biron
murder case 9 to my students. The interroga-
18 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
19 State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 123 N.W.2d 392
(1963), noted in 48 MINN. L. REV. 160 (1963).
Biron was questioned by members of the homicide
division of the Minneapolis police department. The
decision to tape record the questioning was not made
with the intent to offer the tape in evidence (or with
any expectation that it would wind up in evidence),
but on the premise that the suspect would "crack"
quickly and that the playing of Biron's taped confes-
sion to his accomplices would lead them to do like-
wise. But Biron "held out" longer than expected and
various detectives took turns questioning him, some
of whom did not know they were on tape.
Biron's defense lawyer somehow learned that a
tape of his client's police interrogation existed and
when a member of the homicide division so admitted,
the tape was put into evidence. Copies are on file in
the University of Minnesota and University of Michi-
gan law libraries.
The five detectives who questioned Biron at one
time or another were veteran interrogators. Shortly
thereafter, one of them became head of the police
department. Some of their tactics, such as those the
Minnesota Supreme Court held invalidated Biron's
confession, would be sharply condemned by Inbau,
e.g., the misrepresentation that despite the fact Biron
was slightly "over-age" he might be treated as a
juvenile offender if he "cooperates." As the extracts
in the next footnote illustrate, however, many of
their interrogation techniques were recommended
by the standard manuals, e.g., keeping the "subject"
on the defensive, displaying an air of confidence in
the "subject's" guilt, stressing the futility of resistance,
sympathizing with the offender, and minimizing the
moral seriousness of his offense. See the discussion
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-55 (1966).
See also Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession?
Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interroga-
tion and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 729-32
(1963); Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Per-
sons: A Skeptical View, 52J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 21, 23-
26 (1961), reprinted in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 153, 155-58 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
There is no reason to think that the tactics em-
ployed by Biron's experienced interrogators were
any different than those they had utilized in scores
of other cases over the years. So far as I know, this
was the only "confession" they ever lost (at least up
to that point), and it was also the only time a tape of
their interrogation appeared in the record.
(Vol. 68
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tors neither engaged in nor threatened any
violence but their urging, beseeching, whee-
dling, nagging Biron to confess is so repetitious
and so unrelenting20 that two hours of listening is
about all most students can stand. Thirty-six
hours? Breathes there a police interrogator
who can question anyone for that length of
time? Small wonder that Ashcraft's interroga-
" A representative sampling follows:
All we're interested in is the truth, John....
We'll know when you're lying.... You don't
know what we know, do you? You don't know
one bit.... Now, we know you didn't intend to
kill this woman.... You ain't the only guy who
ever made a mistake.... All we want is the
truth, John.... Well, were you drinking? You
didn't deliberately set out to kill a woman. You
aren't that kind of a kid. We know that ....
You're in trouble, John; let us help you ....
Just get it off your chest. We know you didn't
mean to kill her.... You've already told us part
of the story. You've gone part way, now go all
the way .... All we're interested in is the
truth .... Why you've got to lie to cover a lie,
you know that .... You've gone part way, why not
go all the way? Help yourself for a change ....
Make it easy on yourself, make it easy on every-
body .... Everybody makes mistakes. This isn't
John the Baptist you're talking to, you know ....
Quit lying. We know when you're lying ....
This is your opportunity to help yourself. We
don't have to waste our time with you. We know
you did it. You're in the crap-right up to your
ears. This is your opportunity. We've got you-
we've got yougood.... Quit lying.... If you're
not lying, how come you're so nervous?... You
just can't bring yourself to admit it.... It takes
a lot of guts to tell the truth .... You'll feel a
lot better when you get it off your chest. You're
not stupid. You know that .... Were you drink-
ing? All it takes is a couple of drinks and your
mind gets woozy. Is that how it happened?...
It's not unusual for a kid like you to get into
trouble. You're in trouble, my friend; this is your
chance to get out of it .... This has happened
before; you're not the first kid to get into trou-
ble .... Look, I've heard everything in this
business. There isn't anything you can tell me
which will shock me.... Now, we know you're
not a killer. You aren't that kind of a kid. We
know you didn't deliberately kill this woman ....
Help yourself for a change. Let us help you ....
All we're interested in is the truth....
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed Biron's
conviction on the ground that false legal advice
vitiated the confession. The court never suggested
that the gnawing police questioning might be inher-
ently coercive or inherently violative of Biron's right
to counsel or the privilege against self-incrimination;
indeed it repeatedly referred to the interrogation
sessions as "interviews." On this latter point, see note
24 infra.
tors questioned him "in relays"; that "they be-
came so tired they were compelled to rest.
2 1 I
venture to say that if there had been a tape
recording of the Ashcraft interrogation and
the Justices had listened to it in a "hearing
room" set up for that purpose, long before the
tape had ended they would have rushed out
the door aghast-or staggered out, in a near-
catatonic state.
Maybe not. Maybe Justice Jackson, for one,
would have stayed there, to the bitter end,
pondering: "Did Ashcraft do it? Did he kill his
wife?"
There is reason to think Ashcraft did. The
man he named as his wife's killer reminded
him that he did not intend to take the entire
blame, promptly admitted the killing and ac-
cused Ashcraft of hiring him to do the job.
After the interrogation, when examined by his
family physician, Ashcraft neither complained
of his treatment nor avowed his innocence.
Instead he made what this friendly doctor
described as an "entirely voluntary" statement
explaining why he had killed his wife .
22
Ashcraft is a great case only because Jackson's
dissent made it so. The dissent is worth quoting
at length. No piece of writing by Jackson better
illustrates this self-described "country lawyer's"
famed powers of advocacy and his "extraordi-
nary quality of freshness and directness of
approach."' ' And no opinion by any judge, I
think, better captures both the style and sub-
stance of Inbau's views on police interrogation
and confessions:
Interrogation per se is not, while violence per
se is, an outlaw. Questioning is an indispensable
instrumentality of justice. It may be abused, of
course, as cross-examination in court may be
abused, but the principles by which we may
adjudge when it passes constitutional limits are
quite different from those that condemn police
brutality, and are far more difficult to apply.
And they call for a more responsible and cau-
tious exercise of our office. For ... we cannot
read an undiscriminating hostility to mere inter-
rogation into the Constitution without unduly
fettering the States in protecting society from
the criminal.
21 322 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
See id. at 165-67 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
'John Lord O'Brian, in MR. JUSTICE JACKSON 9
(Legal Studies of the William Nelson Cromwell Foun-
dation, 1969) (introduction to speech by Hon. Charles
S. Desmond in honor of Justice Jackson).
1977]
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It probably is the normal instinct to deny and
conceal any shameful or guilty act. Even a "vol-
untary confession" is not likely to be the product
of the same motives with which one may volun-
teer information that does not incriminate or
concern him. The term "voluntary" confession
does not mean voluntary in the sense of a
confession to a priest merely to rid one's soul of
a sense of guilt. "Voluntary confessions" in crim-
inal law are the product of calculations of a
different order, and usually proceed from a
belief that further denial is useless and perhaps
prejudicial. To speak of any confessions of
crime made after arrest as being "voluntary" or
"uncoerced" is somewhat inaccurate, although
traditional.
A confession is wholly and uncontestably vol-
untary only if a guilty person gives himself up
to the law and becomes his own accuser. The
Court bases its decision on the premise that
custody and examination of a prisoner for
thirty-six hours is "inherently coercive." Of
course it is. And so is custody and examination
for one hour. Arrest itself is inherently coercive,
and so is detention ....
But does the Constitution prohibit use of all
confessions made after arrest because question-
ing, while one is deprived of freedom, is "inher-
ently coercive"?...
That the inquiry was prolonged and persist-
ent is a factor that in any calculation of its effect
on Ashcraft would count heavily against the
confession. But some men would withstand for
days pressures that would destroy the will of
others in hours. Always heretofore the ultimate
question has been whether the confessor was in
possession of his own will and self-control at the
time of confession ....
This evidence shows that despite the "inher-
ent coerciveness" of the circumstances of his
examination, the confession when made was
deliberate, free, and voluntary in the sense in
which that term is used in criminal law. This
Court could not, in our opinion, hold this
confession an involuntary one except by substi-
tuting its presumption in place of analysis of
the evidence and refusing to weigh the evidence
even in rebuttal of its presumption.
I am not sure whether the Court denies the
State all right to arrest and question the husband
of the slain woman. No investigation worthy of
the name could fail to examine him. Of all
persons, he was most likely to know whether
she had enemies or rivals ....
Could the State not confront Ashcraft with
his false statements and ask his explanation? He
did not throw himself at any time on his rights,
refuse to answer, and demand counsel, even
according to his own testimony. The strategy of
the officers evidently was to keep him talking,
to give him plenty of rope and see if he would
not hang himself. He does not claim to have
made objection to this. Instead he relied on his
wits. The time came when it dawned on him
that his own story brought him under suspicion,
and that he could not meet it. Must the officers
stop at this point because he was coming to
appreciate the uselessness of deception?
Then he became desperate and accused
[Ware]. Certainly from this point the State was
justified in holding and questioning him as a
witness, for he claimed to know the killer. That
accusation backfired and only turned up a wit-
ness against him. He had run out of expedients
and invention; he knew he had lost the battle of
wits. After all, honesty seemed to be the best,
even if the last, policy. He confessed in detail.
At what point in all this investigation does
the Court hold that the Constitution commands
these officers to send Ashcraft on his way and
give up the murder as insoluble? If the State is
denied the right to apply any pressure to him
which is 'inherently coercive' it could hardly
deprive him of his freedom at all.24
24 322 U.S. at 160-69. See also Watts v. Indiana 338
U.S. 49, 57, 60-62 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See generally, Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interro-
gation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1957);
Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 16 (1961), reprinted in POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 147 (C. Sowle ed.
1962). Inbau, Law Enforcement, the Courts and Civil
Liberties, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 97 (A.
Howard ed. 1965).
Inbau, I am certain, also applauded Justice Jack-
son's criticism of the Ashcraft Court's use of emotive
words: "This questioning is characterized as a 'secret
inquisition,' involving all of the horrendous historical
associations of those words .... [A]ny questioning
may be characterized as an 'inquisition,' but the use
of such characterizations is no substitute for ...
detached and judicial consideration .... 322 U.S.
at 168. Cf. Hearings on H.R. 7525 and S. 486 Before the
Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 323, 329-30 (1963) (statement of Fred E.
Inbau distinguishing between "persuad[ing]" a per-
son to confess or "play[ing] upon his sympathies to
get him to tell you the truth" and "extracting" a
confession or "put[ting] [someone] through the wrin-
ger to get it"). [hereinafter cited as 1963 Senate
Hearings].
Of course, few advocates of any position are able
to eschew emotive language. See, e.g., THE MEDIA
AND THE LAW 2-3 (H. Simmons & J. Califano ed.
1976) ("gag" orders vs. "protective" orders; "national
security" vs. "the right of the public to know"). Critics
of police interrogation do use threatening and per-
jorative terms, but defenders of the system are no
slouches themselves in the art of wordsmanship. The
[Vol. 68
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Justice Black, who wrote the opinion for the
Court in Ashcraft, no less than Justice Jackson,
who authored the ringing dissent, knew full
well that in 1944 neither the Court nor "the
country" was "ready" for an affirmative an-
swer to the question, "[D]oes the Constitution
prohibit use of all confessions made after arrest
because questioning, while one is deprived of
freedom, is 'inherently coercive'?" As we now
know, it was not until 1966 that the Court, if
not "the country," grew "ready."' 6 There is
cause to wonder whether "the country" will
ever grow "ready." And there is reason to think
that the present Court is growing weary.
27
veteran special agent of the Kansas Bureau of Inves-
tigation, Alvin A. Dewey of In Cold Blood fame,
likened a police interrogator to a "good salesman
... selling insurance or a car [who] cannot do his
job if a competitor is standing by, and that is the
situation for the [interrogator] with the presence of
an attorney." Statement before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, July 21, 1966, at 2 (mimeo) (on file
in the University of Michigan Law Library). He also
defined the "interrogation room" as a place "where
people can talk in privacy which is nothing more
than an attorney desires in talking to his client or a
doctor in talking to his patient." Id. Similarly, Chief
Stanley Schrotel of the Cincinnati Police Department,
then the immediate past president of the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police, told a Senate
Committee that "in the interrogation room ... you
have something akin to a lawyer-client relationship,
a doctor-patient relationship." 1963 Senate Hearings,
supra at 286, 294. He also pointed out that "it takes a
very skillful kind of interview, a proper kind of
environment, in order to establish the rapport" nec-
essary to get a heinous offender to confess. Id. at
293. Inbau himself has likened effective police inter-
rogation to an "unhurried interview" and sought
legislative authority "for a reasonable period of police
detention" for the interrogation of suspects "not
unwilling to be interviewed." Inbau, Police Interroga-
tion-A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 16,
18-21 (1961), reprinted in POLICE POWER AND INDIVID-
UAL FREEDOM 147, 149-52 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
Do not those who use such clean, soft words to
describe whai typically must be a grim, unpleasant
(frightening? cruel?) experience contribute to "lin-
guistic pollution, upsetting the ecological balance
between words and their environment"? See Schles-
inger, Politics and the American Language, 43 AMERI-
CAN SCHOLAR 553, 556 (1974).
25 Cf. A. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 221-22 (1964).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 It is probably true that today "nobody, 'liberal'
or 'conservative,' is happy with Miranda," Frankel,
From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 516, 526 (1976), and there is substantial cause
for viewing it as "at best a tense, temporary, ragged
II
It is well known, and it is quite understanda-
ble, that the forthright and occasionally irrev-
erent Inbau is greatly admired-adored may
not be too strong a word-by the thousands of
law enforcement officials who flock to his
"short courses" or applaud his hard-hitting
speeches at their conferences and conventions.
And it is also no secret, and again not surpris-
ing, that many of his fellow law professors do
not hold him in the same regard.
Inbau is an expert, make no mistake about
that, but he is an expert with a maverick strain.
He was, and always will be, the spokesman for
the plain man, no less than for the police
officer and the prosecutor. But the typical
expert does not understand the plain man.
"What he knows, he knows so thoroughly that
he is impatient with men to whom it has to be
explained."' The typical expert "lacks contact
with the plain man. He not only does not know
what the plain man is thinking; he rarely knows
how to discover his thoughts. He has dwelt so
austerely in his laboratory or his study that the
content of the average mind is a closed book to
him." 29
Inbau can, and does, stir the multitudes. His
writing and speaking is "blood-warm"; 0 his
words are "loaded with life." 31 One of his
weapons is "the homely illustration which
makes its way and sinks deep by its appeal to
everyday experience." 32 This, written on the
eve of the "stop and frisk" cases, 3 is typical
Inbau:
truce between combatants," Id. Nevertheless, I doubt
that Miranda will be formally overruled. But see F.
INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL & G.
STARKMAN, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 355 (1974). If Miranda, or some form of
it, does survive, however, it will probably be only
because niggardly interpretations of it, e.g., Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Michigan v. Mos-
ley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Oregon v. Mathiason, 97
S. Ct. 711 (1977), have sufficiently soothed its critics
on the Court.
28 Laski, The Limitations of the Expert, 162 HARPER'S
MONTHLY 101, 104 (1930).
29 Id. at 106.
30 Emerson, The American Scholar, in THE PORTA-
BLE EMERSON 44 (M. Van Doren ed. 1946).
31 Id. at 32.
32 Cardozo, Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITER-
ATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 18 (1931).
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New




Several months ago I received a notice from
the Internal Revenue Service to come to its
Chicago office to explain a couple of business
expense deductions. One related to a deduction
for "an office in home." That referred to a
deduction I listed for 1/6 of my apartment rent
- for a sizeable den used exclusively for my
book writings and various other writings, which,
incidentally, account for a third of my total
income.
It seemed odd that there should be any ques-
tion about this. It also seemed odd that any
question would be raised as to the other modest
items of expense charged against these extra-
curricular income producing activities.
Anyway, I spent several hours locating checks
and records to substantiate these deductions -
time I would have preferred to use in writing
new books or articles. I also appeared in the
IRS office at the designated time of 9:30 A.M. I
sat in a waiting room for my name to be called
- all the while feeling like a charity patient in a
health clinic. At 10:05 my name was called, and
as I walked by, some of the other assembled
suspects, one of them - whom I did not know
but who obviously knew me - exclaimed: "In-
bau; you too!"
This was not an exhilarating experience, I
assure you. Nor did I enjoy baring my financial
soul to the young lady who grilled me for about
twenty minutes.
I hasten to relieve you of any concern over
my future; I was "exonerated"; my return was
approved.
The various tax reports and various other
kinds of reports which a business man has to
make to the Federal and State Governments
require many disclosures of a private nature
and a failure to disclose may incur severe penal-
ties or even a discontinuance of the business
itself. Safety and health inspectors of businesses
call for privacy intrusions. In the labor relations
area, a company has to subject itself to a lot of
disclosures, and to the demands of labor unions
- privacy invasions, they may be fairly called.
Those of you who have travelled abroad and
have had to submit to a customs inspection of
yopr luggage know what it is to have your
privacy invaded.
Now don't misunderstand me. I am not say-
ing, or even intimating, that it is wrong for the
Internal Revenue Service to ask me to explain
my return. Spot checks, or checks based upon
suspicion of a false return, are necessary and in
the public interest. The same holds true for the
disclosures and inspections required of busi-
nesses and travellers. The point I want to make,
however, is that if we so-called law abiding citizens
have to submit to these indignities and invasions of
our privacy - all in the interest and welfare of the
public at large - I find it hard to understand why
anyone, or any group, should complain so vociferously
when a police officer, acting upon reasonable suspi-
don and in a reasonable manner, requests the identity
of, or an explanation from, a person on a dark street
at 3 A.M. in a neighbohood which has been experi-
encing a high incidence of serious crimes. And why,
once the officer does this, should he not be
permitted, for his own protection, to frisk the
detained person in order to be sure he is not
armed with a dangerous weapon? 4
Yes, Inbau could stir the multitudes. He
wrote (horrors) for the Reader's Digest- as well
as the Police Digest,36 the Police Journa17 and
the Police-Law Review .8 He addressed not only
the Conference of Chief Justices s9 and various
annual conventions of the National District
Attorneys Association,4 but the National Asso-
ciation of Independent Insurers, 4 1 the Chicago
Association of Commerce and Industry42 and a
gathering of college alumni at "homecoming.
43
" Unpublished address by Fred E. Inbau, "Mis-
conceptions Regarding Lawlessness and Law En-
forcement," Northwestern Law Alumni Annual
Luncheon, Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 26, 1967) at 4-6 (on
file in the Northwestern and Michigan law libraries).
35 Inbau, Behind Those "Police Brutality" Charges, 89
READER'S DIGEST 1 (July 1966).
36 See note 4 supra.
3 Inbau, Misconceptions Regarding Lawlessness and
Law Enforcement, THE POLICE JOURNAL, Oct. 1969, at
458.
- Inbau, Lawlessness Galore, POLICE-LAw REVIEW,
Aug.-Sept. 1965, at 3.
39 Address by Fred. E. Inbau, "The Arrestee and
Legal Counsel," Annual Conference of Chief Jus-
tices, Washington, D.C., (Aug. 9, 1963) (on file in
the law libraries of Northwestern University and the
University of Michigan).
4 See, e.g., Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil
Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J. CRIa. L.C. &
P.S. 85 (1962). This paper, also discussed at 192 infra,
had been the keynote address at the 1961 Annual
Conference of the National District Attorneys' Asso-
ciation in Portland, Oregon.
41 Address by Fred E. Inbau, "Misconceptions Re-
garding Lawlessness and Law Enforcement," 23rd
annual meeting of National Association of Independ-
ent Insurers, New York, N.Y. (Oct. 29, 1968) (on file
in the law libraries of Northwestern University and
the University of Michigan).
42 Address by Fred E. Inbau, "Crime in Our
Streets-and What Can Be Done About It?", Govern-
mental Affairs Council, Chicago Association of Com-
merce and Industry, Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 25, 1968) (on
file in the law libraries of Northwestern University
and the University of Michigan).43 See Lawlessness Galore, THE TULANIAN, Dec.
1966. at 15.
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(How many law professors could hold that
audience?) But the typical expert "mistrusts his
fellow-specialist when the latter can reach [the]
multitude. For [the typical expert] the gift of
popular explanation is a proof of failure in the
grasp of the discipline. His intensity of gaze
makes him suspect the man who can state the
elements of his mystery in general terms."44
Inbau takes strong positions and is given to
strong words. On occasion, he is even known
to have voiced rage and indignation. These
qualities are not calculated to enhance his status
in the law teaching ranks. Professors, it seems,
are supposed to tiptoe, not crash. They are
supposed to be troubled and tentative, not take
very strong and very clear positions on any-
thing (except, perhaps, right down the middle).
Their stock in trade is not supplying answers
but asking questions (and criticizing others who
have the audacity to propose solutions). They
earn points, it seems, by showing how agoniz-
ingly subtle and complex an issue or a problem
actually is, not by suggesting how simple it might
really be. 45
The safe course for a law professor, it seems,
is to set forth all imaginable arguments (or,
better yet, some unimaginable ones, too) on
both sides (or better yet, on four or five sides),
lament the lack of sufficient data, deplore the
"single-minded thinking" which has character-
ized the field (and probably add that it has
generated "much heat but little light"), recog-
nize that valid principles are "in collision,"
stress that there are no "absolutes," and wind
up troubled (or, better yet, tortured and para-
lyzed) by doubts and uncertainties. The pre-
ferred model, in short, is Tevye the dairyman:
... On the other hand, what kind of match
would that be, with a poor tailor? On the other
hand, he's an honest, hard worker. On the
other hand, he has absolutely nothing. On the
other hand, things could never get worse for
him, they could only get better.4
44 Laski,supra note 28, at 108.
4 One notable exception is C. Black, The Lawful-
ness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960). But see C. Black, Civil Rights in Times of
Economic Stress-Jurisprudential and Philosophic Aspects,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 559.4 Fiddler on the Roof, Act I, Scene VI, in BEST
PLAYS OF THE SIXTIES 283 (S. Richards ed. 1970).
Hopefully, those who arrive at strong conclusions
engage in "on the one hand-on the other hand-
but on the other hand" thinking somewhere along the
Although Inbau is well aware that his views,
and his colorful manner of expressing them,
might irritate, even infuriate, his fellow law
professors, this has not swayed him from his
course.47 Indeed, one of his missions, as he
sees it, is to straighten out "the mess" the law
professors, ex-law professors on the bench,
and other "sensitive souls" have gotten us
into.
48
way. It seems, however, that the preferred style is
not to do so before the speech is delivered or the
article is published, but "out loud" in one's speech or
article-better yet, perhaps, in one's conclusions.
47 In an "editorial," "Playing God": 5 to 4, 57 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 377-78 (1966), Inbau, then Editor-
in-Chief of the Journal, ripped into "the Court's one
man majority" for continuing to "play God" when
the ALI, ABA, various governmental commissions
and other groups were:
seeking to find a proximate solution to some
very difficult problems .... But a one-man ma-
jority of the Court in Miranda "pulled the rug"
from underneath all of these studies and re-
search groups, and effectively foreclosed a final
evaluation of their ultimate findings and rec-
ommendations .... Considering the complexity
of the interrogation-confession problem, a sum-
mary 5 to 4 nullification of much of the afore-
mentioned group efforts . . . is awesomely in-
consistent with fundamental democratic con-
cepts. It's more like "Playing God: 5 to 4."
A year and a half later, Inbau took cognizance of
the fact that his "Playing God" editorial had "infuri-
ated many of my colleagues in the law school world,"
but "[w]hat I said then may be appropriately repeated
now, although I regret whatever infuriation it may
again arouse among my law professor colleagues
who may be in the audience tonight." Unpublished
address by Fred E. Inbau, "Crime and the Supreme
Court," Symposium by the Council of Graduate Stu-
dents, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, (April
24, 1968) (on file in the law libraries of Northwestern
University and the University of Michigan).
48 In Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.
R. 11477, S. 2970, S. 3325 and S. 3355, at 58, 65
(1968) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Senate Hearings],
Inbau (who stressed at the outset that he did not
appear 'just" in "his capacity" as a law professor, but
as one with much "practical experience") "explained"
how the McNabb innovation came about:
Unfortunately the United States Supreme
Court, and it was made up at that time of some
even more sensitive souls than we see, perhaps
at the present time-there were some law pro-
fessors on it, ex-law professors-and they as-
sumed that these practices which were revealed
in these [coerced confession) decisions were
commonplace, they were universal, and the
Court, acting in that feeling of resentment, laid




Inbau came to the podium from the crime
lab, the interrogation room and the trial
courts, 49 not the library. Not only was he a
pioneer in the development of the polygraph
and in the "psychology" of obtaining confes-
sions, but in his younger days he had been the
premier lie-detector examiner and just about
the craftiest interrogator around. In the course
of obtaining hiundreds of confessions, he had
been known to spill over with such "sympathy"
for a murder suspect that he had had to "pause
to wipe away a tear."5' He prefers to represent
himself (and perhaps think of himself) as a
"practical man" rather than a "law professor."51
Most professors (and too many judges), I think
he would say, are "too naive and otherworldly
to intervene in a brass-knuckle world. '52
If Inbau much cared about how his brethren
in the law teaching ranks regard him, however,
I think he would be puzzled by the "chilling"
effect of his strong positions and strong words.
After all, John Henry Wigmore, his idol, men-
tor, friend, associate and ideological ally,53 was
41 Immediately after earning a master's in law at
Northwestern University in 1933, Inbau became a
member of the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory
at the Northwestern University School of Law, the
first such laboratory in the country. When the Chi-
cago Police Department took over the laboratory in
1938, he became its first director and served in this
capacity until 1941. For the eight years he was associ-
ated with the crime detection laboratory, "criminal
interrogation" was his "special interest." See 1958
Senate Hearings, supra note 48, at 58. From 1941 until
1945, when he returned to Northwestern as a profes-
sor of law, Inbau was a trial attorney. At one time or
another he was president of the Illinois Academy of
Criminology, the American Academy of Forensic
Sciences and the American Academy of Polygraph
Examiners.
S0 See Lewellen, How to Make a Killer Confess, SAT.
EvE. POST, Mar. 31, 1956, at 33.
5111 do not come here to visit with you in my
capacity as a criminal-law professor. I know from
my own practical experience, both as a trial
lawyer and by reason of my work in the police
field, that there is an allergy toward professors
on the part of people who are out on the firing
line. I prefer to represent myself to you as one
who has had experience in this area of interroga-
tion.
Inbau, in A Forum on the Interrogation of the Accused, 49
CORNELL L. Q. 382, 387 (1964) (panel discussion spon-
sored by the District Attorney's Association of the
State of New York). See also 1958 Senate Hearings,
supra note 48, at 58.
52 See S. KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT AND POL-
ITICAL FREEDOM 2 (1968).
-1 Inbau, I am sure, regarded his being named
the first John Henry Wigmore Professor at the
known for his "sharp and uncompromising"
criticisms.5 4 Although a person of elegant man-
Northwestern University School of Law as being
given the highest honor that could be bestowed on
any student of criminal law and evidence. Wigmore
was the organizer and founder of the Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory, to which Inbau devoted the
first decade of his professional life. Wigmore also
launched The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
in 1910 and contributed "a forthright comment ...
upon a recent criminal case" to its first issue. Inbau,
The Innovator (Editorial), 32 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 263,
264 (1941) (editorial). Inbau, of course, was deeply
devoted, and a frequent contributor, to the Journal
all of his professional life. He served as its Managing
Director from 1945-65, and then its Editor-in-Chief
until 1971, when student editors took complete
charge of the publication.
The last activity in Wigmore's extraordinary career
was participation, along with Inbau, in a regular
meeting of the Board of Editors of the Journal (April
20, 1943). He died a few hours later. Inbau was the
last person to talk to Wigmore. He hailed the cab in
which Wigmore met his death.
Wigmore's "last words" on the U.S. Supreme
Court were words of reproachment for its recent
decision in the McNabb case: "He shook his head
slowly as he said prophetically that he could see
neither sense nor reason in it; that it is bound to
cause trouble for it makes it almost impossible for
either the police or the prosecutor to get anywhere
with their cases; and that he did not know what the
Supreme Court could have been thinking about when
it wrote that opinion." Curran, Dean Wigmore at His
Last Meeting of the Editorial Board, 34J. CRIN. L.C. &
P.S. 93, 94 (1943).
The decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), was hard enough for Inbau to take, but for
Justice Goldberg, author of the opinion of the Court,
to find support for his viewpoint in the writings of
Wigmore was almost more than Inbau could bear.
See his remarks in The Supreme Court's Decisions on
Defendants' Rights and Criminal Procedures, 39 F.R.D.
423, 441 (1966) (panel discussion):
I think it is a serious mistake to say that when
we ask for an interrogation opportunity on the
part of the police we are asking for the abolition
of the privilege against self-incrimination. Un-
fortunately, Justice Goldberg made the same
error in his opinion in the Escobedo case. If you
recall, ... he quotes Dean Wigmore's reasons
in support of the privilege [378 U.S. at 489,
quoting from 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251,
at 309 (3d ed. 1940)] and then equates that with
his approval of the exclusionary rule and the
present rules with respect to confession admissi-
bility. Justice Goldberg, I think, should have
known better. He was a student of Wigmore's.
And Wigmore's treatise very clearly indicates
his violent opposition to the exclusionary rule
and to any rule of confession admissibility other
than one based upon the trustworthiness factor.
I not only know that from Wigmore's writ-
ings, but I knew the gentleman very well.... I
am quite sure he would be greatly disturbed to
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ners, when he thought the occasion demanded
it, "the Colonel" could strike with the force of
an army mule (or the "bite" of a first
sergeant),u yet this did not prevent him from
being acclaimed as "our first legal scholar."56
Indeed, Wigmore's Treatise on Evidence, "unri-
valed as the greatest treatise on any single
subject of the law,' 5 7 contains a generous
amount of scathing, colorful criticism of the
courts - oftenfor the very reasons that Inbau has
never stopped reproaching them:
Does the illegal source of a piece of evidence
taint it so as to exclude it, when offered by the
party who has shared in the illegality?
... An employer may perhaps suitably inter-
rupt the course of his business to deliver a
homily to his office-boy on the evils of gambling
or the rewards of industry. But a judge does
not hold court in a streetcar to do summary
justice upon a fellow-passenger who fraudu-
lently evades payment of his fare; and, upon
the same principle, he does not attempt, in the
course of a specific litigation, to investigate and
punish all offences which incidentally cross the
path of that litigation. Such a practice might be
consistent with the primitive system of justice
under an Arabian sheikh; but it does not com-
port with our own system of law. 58
see himself quoted in the Escobedo case as though
he were supporting that viewpoint.
As I read the 130-page discussion of confessions in
volume 3 of the Treatise on Evidence, a volume to
which the Escobedo opinion never refers, Inbau is
plainly right about Wigmore. See 3 J. WIGMORE
§§ 22-24, 826, 841-43, 856-59, 865, 867 (3d. ed. 1940).
54 Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore-Scholar and Re-
former, 53J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 277, 280 (1962).
55 In addition to the examples furnished by Roalfe,
supra note 54, see especially Wigmore, Abrams v.
U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in
War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539 (1920)
(blistering attack on Holmes-Brandeis position). See
also note 57 infra and text accompanying notes 58-61
infra.
58 Kocourek, John Henry Wigmore, 27 AM. JUD.
Soc'y 122, 124 (1943).
57 Frankfurter, John Henry Wigmore: A Centennial
Tribute 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 443 (1963), reprinted in F.
FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE & OTHER THINGS
THAT MATTER 256 (P. Kurland ed. 1965). In the
controversy growing out of the Sacco-Vanzetti case,
Professor Frankfurter had been a target of
Wigmore's biting tongue. "He never referred to
Frankfurter by name but called him the 'plausible
Pundit' or 'contra-canonical critic' because of his
alleged violation of the [canons of ethics]." Roalfe,
supra note 54, at 280.
58 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183, at 4-5 (3d ed.
1940).
[T]he heretical influence of Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), establishing the ex-
clusionary rule in federal search and seizure
cases] spread, and evoked a contagion of senti-
mentality in some of the State Courts, inducing
them to break loose from long-settled funda-
mentals.
... After the enactment of the Eighteenth
Amendment and its auxiliary legislation, pro-
hibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, a new
and popular occasion was afforded for the mis-
placed invocation of this principle; and the ju-
dicial excesses of many Courts in sanctioning its
use give an impression of easy complaisance
which would be ludicrous if it were not so
dangerous to the general respect for law and
order in the community. 59
... If the officials, illegally searching, came
across an infernal machine, planned for the city's
destruction, and impounded it, shall we say that
the diabolical owner of it may appear in court,
brazenly demand process for its return, and be
supinely accorded by the Court a writ of restitu-
tion, with perhaps on apology for the "outrage"?
Such is the logical consequence of the doctrine
of Weeks v. U.S....
[T]he essential fallacy of [Weeks] and its suc-
cessors is that it virtually creates a novel excep-
tion, where the Fourth Amendment is involved,
to the fundamental principle ... that an illegal-
ity in the mode of procuring evidence is no ground for
excluding it. The doctrine of such an exception
rests on a reverence for the Fourth Amendment
so deep and cogent that its violation will be
taken notice of, at any cost of other justice, and
even in the most indirect way....
[This view] puts Supreme Courts in the posi-
tion of assisting to undermine the foundations
of the very institutions they are set there to
protect. It regards the over-zealous officer of
the law as a greater danger to the community
than the unpunished murderer or embezzler or
panderer.60
... Holmes, J., in his dissent [in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)] refers to this act
of wiretapping as "dirty business." But so is likely
to be all apprehension of malefactors. Kicking a
man in the stomach is "dirty business," normally
viewed. But if a gunman assails you, and you
know enough of the French art of "savatage" to
kick him in the stomach and thus save your life,
is that "dirty business" for you? ...6
59 Id. 6 2184, at 32-34.
60 Id. at 35-37.
61 Id. § 2184b, at 50 Cf. Inbau, Police Interrogation-
A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 16, 19
(1961), reprinted in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL
1977]
III
In the March, 1962, issue of this Journal,
Fred Inbau published one of his many "prose-
cutors' convention" speeches, Public Safety v.
Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand,6 2
but one whose criticism of the Warren Court
struck me as especially bitter and scathing-
even for Inbau. I regarded it, and I think it
may be fairly termed, an "intemperate" piece.
I expressed my sense of outrage to Claude
Sowle, then Editor-in-Chief of theJournal, who
encouraged me to respond. I then dashed off
what may fairly be called an "intemperate"
reply.63 I was furious. Inbau had ripped into
the Court I loved and my thinking then was
that "[t]o war against the Court was to war
against the Constitution itself."64 Up to that
time, I had never met Inbau and it would
hardly have surprised me if, after reading my
biting reply, Inbau had vowed to keep it that
way. Instead, he invited me to attend the next
Northwestern University School of Law Con-
ference on Criminal Justice.
The Conference (held in November of '62)
turned out to be a memorable occasion. It was
there that I first made contact with many law
enforcement officers. It was there, too, that I
first met James R. Thompson, Claude R.
Sowle, and Bernard Weisberg, as well as Inbau.
I expected Thompson, then a very recent
graduate of Northwestern and a lecturer in
Inbau's Short Course for Prosecutors, to be
very much under the influence of his mentor,
FREEDOM 147, 151 (C. Sowle ed. 1962):
[T]he interrogation [of the murder suspect in
an actual case within Inbau's "own professional
experience"] was "unethical" according to the
standards usually set for professional, business
and social conduct .... But, under the circum-
stances involved in this case, how else would the
murderer's guilt have been established? More-
over, . . . [firom the criminal's point of view,
any interrogation of him is objectionable. To
him it may be a "dirty trick" to be talked into a
confession, for surely it was not done for his
benefit.
62 See note 40 supra.
63 Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some
"Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 171
(1962). We then went another round: Inbau, More
About Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties, 53 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 329 (1962); Kamisar, Some Reflet-
tions on Criticizing the Courts and 'Policing the Police,"
53J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 453 (1962).
64 Cf. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
265 (1962).
but that was not at all the case. Thompson
even had some nice things to say about the
McNabb-Mallory rule and thought there was
much to be said for the Supreme Court of
Illinois adopting such a rule.65 Inbau didn't
seem to mind at all.'If anything, he seemed to
be proud of the fact that Thompson was his
''own man."
Claude Sowle, another former Inbau student
and then Inbau's junior colleague on the
Northwestern Law Faculty, gave a stirring talk,
striking at the heart of Inbau's position on
police interrogation and confessions. He at-
tacked the hypocrisy pervading the criminal
justice system; measured the proceedings in
the "interrogation" room against the standard
of a public trial and found the former sorely
wanting-indeed, based upon nullification of
the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to the assistance of counsel-and spelled
out how all too often the "legal courts" are
reduced to the position of merely ratifying the
verdict obtained by the police-conducted "out-
law tribunals." Sowle's remarks had a stunning
impact on the audience and inspired me, some
years later, to write my "Gatehouses and Man-
sions" paper.
66
While Sowle was speaking, I studied Inbau
closely. I half expected him to shout, "That's
enough, Claude!" Instead, Inbau seemed to
be basking in the brilliance and independence
of his junior colleague. He seemed pleased
that Sowle had the rapt attention of the audi-
ence, especially the many police officers in
attendance.
Another speaker, Bernard Weisberg, also
attacked the Inbau position. The contention
that all statements made after a suspect's re-
quest to contact counsel has been denied should
be barred on that ground alone had been
rejected in Crooker, the Court maintaining that
such a rule "would effectively preclude police
65 Some years later, then Assistant Professor
Thompson spelled out his views on the subject in
Detention After Arrest and In-Custody Investigation: Some
Exclusionary Principles, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 390, 402-14.
1 Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Man-
sions of American Criminal Procedure, in Y. KAMISAR,
F. INBAU & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR
TIME. (Howard ed. 1965). Unfortunately, on the
erroneous assumption that Professor Sowle's remarks
would later be published, I took no notes at the
time, only to discover later that the speaker had
destroyed his. I again acknowledge my large debt to
Sowle. See also, id. at 20 n.53.
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questioning- fair as well as unfair-until the
accused was afforded opportunity to call his
attorney. 67 Inbau, of course, applauded this
stand. But Weisberg argued most persuasively
that in the real world "fair" or "proper" or
"reasonable" police questioning was virtually
non-existent-and he quoted extensively from
Inbau's interrogation manual to make his
point. Moreover, pointed out Weisberg, even
if the courts could decide when "reasonable"
interrogation had come to an end (which he
doubted), they could not hope to do so unless
full records of these essentially unsupervised
proceedings were available for review-and
they almost never were.
Weisberg's remarks infuriated many of the
police in attendance. One captain leaped to his
feet and growled at Weisberg that someone
who had never conducted an interrogation
himself had no business talking about the sub-
ject-and couldn't have anything worthwhile
to say. Inbau rushed to the microphone. A
good argument could be made, he smiled, that
only someone who had been on the receiving
end of a police interrogation was qualified to
talk about the subject. He had neglected to
invite such a person, but Weisberg, he sug-
gested, was the next best thing. Weisberg was a
thoughtful, articulate spokesman for the ac-
cused. True, evidently Weisberg believed that
the established practice of police questioning
was fundamentally and hopelessly irreconcila-
ble with the adversary system of justice and the
Constitution, but so did some members of the
Supreme Court. Some day-and not in the too
distant future- Weisberg's views might com-
mand a majority of the Court. A major purpose
of the conference, Inbau reminded the many
police officers in the audience, was not just to
entertain them with speakers they liked to hear,
but to present speakers who would tell them
what they ought to know and had to think
about. (This, I asked myself, was the zealous,
pugilistic Fred Inbau? This was the fabled
"Freddy the Cop"?)6
67 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958)
(emphasis in original).
68 A few months earlier, although I did not dis-
cover this until many years later, Inbau had done
more than simply defend the civil libertarian's right
to have his say before a police audience. See unpub-
lished and untitled address of May 28, 1962 (emphasis
added), at Willamette College of Law, Salem, Ore.
(on file in the law libraries of Northwestern Univer-
Weisberg was indeed a thoughtful, articulate
spokesman. Two years earlier, again in the
setting of a conference conceived and planned
by Inbau, he had delivered what I consider the
most probing and most useful paper ever writ-
ten on the subject, Police Interrogation of Arrested
Persons: A Skeptical View. 69 Of all the contribu-
tors to this "International Conference on Crim-
inal Law," Weisberg's criminal justice creden-
tials were the least impressive. He had no law
enforcement background. He was a general
practitioner, engaged mostly in corporate and
business law. But Inbau had "discovered" Weis-
berg when the latter had co-authored a 1959
report by the Illinois Division of the ACLU,
sity and the University of Michigan). He had told a
group of police officers:
Too often there is the tendency on the part
of the police to criticize all that the courts do -
to label as technicalities the reasons given for
any particular case decision that the individual
police officer dislikes. There are times, to be
sure, when that is true. But there are many
times when the reasons are substantial and basi-
cally valid ....
As a police officer you may feel that the
courts should leave you alone in your efforts to
enforce the law, to apprehend criminals and to
protect the public. Many courts would also like
to be left alone to do as they please. Many
legislators would also like to be left alone and
unchecked. Many members of the executive
branch . . . would also like to function as they
please. But in a democratic system, no branch
of government, can be permitted to exercise
unbridled authority and power....
In any democratic society individual rights
and liberties must be preserved and we are
willing to do so at the expense of efficiency in
government itself. To relate this principle to
your situation, let me put it this way. We would
rather that some criminals escape detection and
punishment-even though you, as a police offi-
cer, know positively he is guilty-rather than
sacrifice or even jeopardize the rights and liber-
ties of the great mass of individuals who make
up this democratic society of ours. This concept
is essential. It is different in Russia, of course.
There, efficiency is paramount [emphasis added].
Parts of this speech read as if they came right out
of a Hugo Black opinion or Professor Louis B.
Schwartz's ringing civil liberties article, On Current
Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
157 (1954).
69 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 21 (1961), in POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153 (C. Sowle ed.
1962) [hereinafter referred to as Weisberg]. This
article reproduces a paper Weisberg delivered at




Secret Detention by Chicago Police-and he had
given him a wide stage.
Weisberg had the advantages of the ama-
teur-"the freedom from traditional limitations
and perspectives, the ability to raise fundamen-
tal questions which professionals in the field
have long since forgotten to consider. ' 70 When
he came to examine police interrogation, Weis-
berg was astounded by the virtually unbridled
discretionary powers wielded by the "adminis-
trative agencies" (police departments) and "ad-
ministrative officials" (police officers) in this
field and by their ability "to prevent objective
recordation of the facts":
The modern police function of preliminary
criminal investigation and interrogation of sus-
pects is an unusual instance of discretionary
administrative power over persons unregulated
by judicial standards.... In large measure
police station questioning ... is governed only
by the self-imposed restraints of the police and
by limited judicial action in the small number of
cases in which police conduct becomes a litigated
issue.
Whatever the reasons for their circumspec-
tion, the failure of the courts to assume super-
visory powers over police interrogation practices
remains an anomaly. It is sometimes grounded
on the American separation of judicial and ex-
ecutive powers. But this doctrine has not pre-
vented the courts from developing judicial stan-
dards for other administrative agencies.
Measured by legal standards, the most unique
feature of the police station questioning is its
characteristic secrecy. It is secrecy which creates
the risk of abuses, which by keeping the record
incomplete makes the rules about coercion
vague and difficult to apply, which inhibits the
development of clear rules to govern police
interrogation and which contributes to public
distrust of the police. Secrecy is not the same as
the privacy which interrogation specialists insist
is necessary for effective questioning. Inconspi-
cuous recording equipment or concealed ob-
servers would not detract from the intimacy
between the interrogator and his subject which
is said to increase the likelihood of confession.
No other case comes to mind in which an
administrative official is permitted the broad
discretionary power assumed by the police inter-
rogator, together with the power to prevent
objective recordation of the facts.... It is
secrecy, not privacy, which accounts for the
absence of a reliable record of interrogation
proceedings in a police station. If the need for
70 Rostow, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 412, 413
(1947) (referring to Morris R. Cohen).
some prejudicial questioning is assumed, privacy
may be defended on grounds of necessity; se-
crecy cannot be defended on this or any other
ground .71
Weisberg deemed it important to "give some
content to the generalities [one might say, 'eu-
phemisms'] in which the subject [of police ques-
tioning] is usually discussed. '72 He thought it
"playing Hamlet without the ghost to discuss
police questioning without knowing what such
quesioning is really like." 73 So he turned to
"the leading police manual by Professor Fred
Inbau and John Reid" to supply the content. 74
So far as I know, Weisberg was the first law
review writer to make extensive use of the
interrogation manuals. And, as I have sug-
gested elsewhere, each of these manuals may
have been "equal to a dozen law review articles
in its impact on the Court. '75 For "one of the
71 Weisbergsupra note 69, at 44-45.
Of course, Weisberg's criticism of the old "volun-
tariness" test applies to Miranda as well, at least as it
has generally been applied. Although language in
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, strongly suggests that, at
least where feasible, the police must stenographically
or, better yet, electronically record the warnings
given to the suspect, as well as his response, so that
they may be played back or shown to the court,
"most courts have held that the testimony of an
officer that he gave the warnings is sufficient and
need not be corroborated." ALI MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 140 (commentary)
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1974).
Weisberg's extraordinary 1960 paper also antici-
pates and voices grave doubts about the efficacy of a
system based on police-issued cautions or warnings:
[A]ny rule which requires a caution inevitably
invites avoidance. Even if it is tied to an objective
event such as the commencement of interroga-
tion or the time of arrest, the probable conflict
of testimony about whether a required caution
was in fact given makes satisfactory judicial
enforcement doubtful. Any rule requiring a
warning is also likely to be ineffectual since the
significance and effect of a warning depend
primarily on emphasis and the spirit in which it
was given. A warning can easily become a mean-
ingless ritual .... The notion that [the interro-
gator] should precede questioning with a cau-
tion suggests that the interrogator should act to
protect the interests of the suspect at the same
time that he is attempting to obtain damaging
statements from him. But this cannot effectively
substitute for the loyalty of counsel or the disin-
terestedness of a judge.
Weisberg, supra note 69, at 40-41.
72 Weisberg, supra note 69, at 22.
7 3 Id.
74 Id. at 22-23.
75 Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents, 65
MICH. L. REV. 59, 86 (1966).
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most powerful features of the Due Process
Model," as the late Herbert Packer observed,
"is that it thrives on visibility. People are willing
to be complacent about what goes on in the
criminal process as long as they are not too
often or too explicitly reminded of the gory
details "76
As fate would have it, Inbau's former stu-
dent, Jim Thompson, was to argue the Escobedo
case for the State of Illinois, and Inbau's
"adopted" student, Bernie Weisberg, was to
argue the case for the ACLU, as amicus curiae .
77
In his Escobedo brief, Weisberg maintained that
since police interrogaion of arrested persons is
characteristically conducted in privacy and
without a record being made, "the best sources"
for understanding police questioning "are the
published manuals."7 8 Weisberg
urge[d] the Court to examine these books [which
he extracted at considerable length in his brief].
They are not exhibits in a museum of third de-
gree horrors. Indeed they carefully advise the
police interrogator to avoid tactics which are
clearly coercive under prevailing law. They are
invaluable because they vividly describe the kind
of interrogation practices which are accepted as
lawful and proper under the best current stand-
ards of professional police work.7 9
Weisberg's great paper on confessions and
his powerful Escobedo brief set the fashion for
civil libertarians. The ACLU brief in Miranda
(a magnificent performance by Professors An-
thony Amsterdam, Paul Mishkin, et al.) re-
printed a full chapter from O'Hara's Fundamen-
tals of Criminal Investigation (1956). In turn, the
majority opinion in Miranda devoted six full
pages to extracts from various police manuals
and texts8° "document[ing] procedures em-
ployed with success in the past, and ... recom-
mend[ing] various other effective tactics."81
Many of the examples selected by the Court are
76 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U.
PA. L. REv. 1, 64 (1964).
77 Inbau didn't gain a "clean sweep." Barry L.
Kroll, a Michigan Law School graduate, argued the
cause for Danny Escobedo.
78 See the extracts from the brief in Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 519 (4th ed. 1974).7
9Id.
80 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,449-54 (1966).
81 Id. at 448. The Miranda dissenters criticized the
Court for failing to establish that any of the manuals
were the "official manuals" of any police department
or even that they were widely used by police interro-
gators, and voiced doubts that they were, 384 U.S. at
the same ones Weisberg used in his 1960 article
and in his 1964 Escobedo brief.
Now the curious thing about Weisbergs im-
portant contribution to the law of confessions
is that, as he readily admits, he never would
have pursued his interest in this field but for
Inbau's encouragement. It is a delicious irony that
when Inbau urged Weisberg to think more
deeply about the vexing problems of police
interrogation and confessions- when back in
1960 he invited this relatively obscure general
practitioner to deliver a major paper articulat-
ing his "skeptical views" on the subject-Inbau
did what some think the privilege against self-
incrimination is supposed to prevent-he
pulled the lever which sprung the trap on
which he stood .
2
The Miranda opinion quotes from or cites
the 1953 and 1962 Inbau-Reid manuals no less
than ten times-and never with approval 2 It
is plain that these publications "vented Chief
Justice Warren's judicial ire. ' ' s The day after
Miranda was handed down, Inbau should have
been a beaten man. But he wasn't.85
He knew, no less than did our most brilliant
civil liberties lawyer, that "the judgments" that
these issues require "are too large, too ungov-
499, 532-33. Two weeks after Miranda was handed
down, however, Thomas C. Lynch, then Attorney
General of California, reported that a preliminary
survey indicated "wide use" in his state of the critf-
cized manuals and that he was considering a "purge"
of all such publications. Professor Philip Zimbardo, a
psychologist greatly troubled by various interrogation
techniques, also reported that he had "verified that
these manuals are used in training [police] interro-
gators by calling several police academies." See Kam-
isar, supra note 75, at 86 n.109.
82 See, e.g., E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
TODAY 7 (1955).
" See 384 U.S. at 449-55. The references are to F.
INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS (1962); F. INBAU &J. REID, LIE DETEc-
TION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (3d ed. 1953).
84 Broderick, Book Review, 53 CORNELL L. REV.
737, 741 (1968).
85 Indeed, a year after Miranda, the irrepressible
Inbau-Reid team published a new edition of their
interrogation manual, retaining, after the prescribed
warnings have been given, many of the tactics and
techniques that seem to have chagrinned the author
of the Miranda opinion. See Broderick, supra note 84.
But Miranda "did not condemn any specific tech-
niques or hold that evidence obtained by use of them
would be inadmissible. Reliance was placed on warn-
ing and counsel to protect the suspect." Elsen &
Rosett, Protections for the Suspect under Miranda v.




erned by a commanding text or clear institu-
tional dictates, to be laid solidly to rest.8s6 He
knew, too, that "[pirecedents upon such issues
are particularly fragile under the buffeting of
rapid historical developments that incessantly
place unprecedented strains upon the Court. 7
As it turned out, a period of "social upheaval,
violence in the ghettos, and disorder on the
campuses"88 had already begun. The political
assassinations and near-assassinations of the
late 1960's; more urban "riots"; the presidential
campaign of 1968; the "obviously retaliatory"
provisions of the Crime Control Act of 1968
and other political exploitation of the "law and
order" issue; the ever-soaring crime statistics; 9
and the ever-spreading fears of the breakdown
of public order soon "combined to create an
atmosphere that, to say the least, was unfavor-
able to the continued vitality of the Warren
Court's mission in criminal cases." 90
I was one of those who implored the Court
to "exercise leadership," to be "bold" and "in-
novative." Yet I was outraged when "its deci-
sions arouse[d], as they must, resentment and
political attack." 91 At this point, I became a
lawyer "marching behind the solemn, sacro-
sanct banner of the law. [I] want[ed] it both
ways."' ? It seems much clearer to me today
than it was fifteen years ago, or even ten,
that-although he was wrong on the merits-
Inbau was perfectly within his rights in deplor-
ing, and arguing against, McNabb, Mallory,
Mapp and Miranda.
Although I happen to think that most of
Inbau's ideas deserve to be rejected, he never-
theless furthered, or should have furthered,
the thinking of all of us. As one of the "Crime
Control model's" "few full-fledged academic
defenders," 93 Inbau not only presents the po-
88 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353 (1974).
87 Id.
' Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The
Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F.
518, 539.
89But see Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse-and Fight
Back with-Crime Statistics, 25 OKA. L. REv. 239
(1972).
90 Allen, supra note 88 at 539.91 Jaffe, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1111 (1963).
92 Id.
13 ,The late Alexander Bickel so described Inbau.
See Bickel, The Role of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 44 TEX. L. REV. 954, 962 (1966).
When Bickel used the "Crime Control model"
liceman's view of recent cases, but articulates
the officer's critical needs and deep concerns.
Too many of us are content to point out what
the policeman cannot or must not do. Inbau, on
the other hand, will pepper you with hypothet-
ical fact situations and ask: "You are the police-
man; what would you do in this case?" More
times than I like to admit, I have felt that the
price of remaining faithful to the "Due Process
model" 94 was to appear rather foolish. What
can the policeman do? What should he be able
to do? How can the legislature be of assistance
to him? I don't think I am the only law profes-
sor who finds it more exhilarating to confine
himself to what the policeman cannot or must
not do. gut the time has long since passed
when we can afford that luxury.
Most people know Inbau only from the rous-
ing talks he gave at the local Rotary Club or
from the fighting speeches he delivered at
countless prosecutor and police conventions,
exhorting the troops to victory in the great
"war against crime." But there is more than
one Inbau. There is also the Inbau who, in the
privacy of his office or over a drink, can dispas-
sionately and masterfully dissect the latest Su-
preme Court opinions; who can laugh as hard
at himself as he does at the "law professors" on
and off the bench. There is also the Inbau
whose goal at each of the many conferences he
conceives and directs is to bring to bear upon
problem areas "the greatest possible breadth of
viewpoint and depth of insight" 95 and to have
term he was, of course, referring to Professor
Packer's famous article, Two Models of the Criminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964). Packer subse-
quently rather summarily described the "polar ex-
tremes" which represent "competing value choices"
as follows:
The Crime Control model sees the efficient,
expeditious and reliable screening and disposi-
tion of persons as the central value to be served
by the criminal process. The Due Process model
sees that function as limited by and subordinate
to the maintenance of the dignity and autonomy
of the individual. The Crime Control model is
administrative and managerial; the Due Process
model is adversary and judicial. The Crime
Control model may be analogized to an assembly
line, the Due Process model to an obstacle
course.
Packer, The Courts, The Police and the Rest of Us, 57 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 238, 239 (1966).94See note 93 supra.
9 See the introduction to the collection of confer-
ence papers in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREE-
DOM (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
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all in attendance leave with their swords and
banners lowered and their sensitivities raised.
As an "expert in controversy," this iconoclastic
law professor, no less than the "iconoclast from
Baltimore," "welcomed attacks on himself,
partly because they showed that his thrusts had
gone home, partly because he defended every-
one's right to have his say, and partly because
he felt that destructive criticism, even of his
own work, was much more stimulating than
acclaim ."96
Fred would be quick to deny that he is "the
professor." If anything, he sees himself as the
"anti-professor"-or so he says, Methinks he
does protest too much. One of the Inbaus, at
least, is more "the professor" than a considera-
ble number who profess to be, more "the
professor" than any of the Inbaus would ever
care to admit.
90 D. Stenerson, H. L. MENCKEN: ICONOCLAST
FROM BALTIMORE 226 (1971).
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